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INTRODUCTION
The link between  macroeconomic  policies,  trade regimes,  and competitive  factor markets has
been well documented.y The choice of an inward-  or an outward-fccused  trade regime is an
important determinant  of relative  factor prices  and employment. While  considerable  attention  has
been given  to the connection  between  trade and employment,  much 3oss attention  has been given to
the effect of this relationship  on human resources  development. This paper looks at how a country  s
choice of devc-lopment  strategies  shapes  incentives  for the efficient  use of resources  in education  and
training.  It examines  the importance  of export-led  developmer4  to competition  in factor markets  and
incentives  for private  and public investments  in sk lis development. It is particularly  interested  in how
competitive  factor markets  affect the efficient  use of public resources  in education  and training.
A comparative  approach is used to address  these issuas. Six developing  countries  -- Egypt,
Malaysia,  Nigeria,  South Korea,  Thailand,  and Tunisia  -- were chosen  to achieve  a mix of development
strategies  for study.  Background  papers  were prepared  describing  the macroeconomic  policy
environment,  development  strategies,  and the structure  and performance  of the vocational  education
and training system in each country during the 1980s. Other country-specific  sources of information
were used, including studies  by the World Bank. The comparative  approach furnishes  evidence  of a
link between  the macroeconomic  environment  and human  resources  development. Developing
countries  with outward-focused  trade policies  are found to rely more heavily  on private  resources  in
skills development  and encourage  greater efficiency  in the public delivery  of skills training.
The study begins with an ee^planation  of the theory that links macroeconomic  policies,  trade
regimes,  and competitive  factor markets. It describes  how the choice of a trade regime  influences
competition  in capital  and labor markets,  and how this competition  affects  the market signals  that
guide investments  in human resources  development. The theory is used to develop  questions  for
fuRther  study.  Next,  macroeconomic  trends and development  strategies  in each of the six countries  in
i'  See,  for example,  Krueger (1988);  Haggblade,  et al. (1986);  and Belassa  (1988)2
the 1980s  are compared. The trade regime  of each country is identified  and linked to competition  in
capital and labor markets. Than, research  questions Involving  the macroeconomic  environment  and
its Impact  on human resources  development  are studied  by comparing  the structure  and performance
of vocational  education and training in each country. Conclusions  and poiicy implications  are
discussed.
CHOOSING  A TRADE  REGIME
A country's choice of trade regimes and related  macroeconomic  policies influence  the
composition of production  for import-substitution  and export. An inward-focused  trade regime
encourages  production  for import-substitution  by increasing  the cost of imported gLods through tariff
and non-tariff  restrictions  on trade. These  restrictions  by Pheltering producers  from global competition
make production  for import-substitution  more proftable than producing  for export. An outward-
focused  trade regime  on the other hand encourages  production  for export by lowering trade
restrictions  and reducinn  the profitability  of import-substitution.  The choice of trade regimes has
implications  for factor markets,  affecting  among other things,  employment  and skills demand.
Factor Market ImRllcatlons
Th+.  impact of a trade regime  on factor markets is shaped by the scope of protectionism. An
inward-focu .'  trade regime  with high levels  of protection  creates  market  conditions that encourage
the segmentation  of capital  and labor markets. Where  this happens,  production  in the modem sector
of an economy tends to becLme mgre capital-  and skill-intensive  than it would be In  the absence  of
protectionist  trade policies.Y The opposite condition holds, however,  for production in the informal
sector. This distortion of factor markets  raises  the issue of whether these price distortions,  especially
for labor, reduce incentives  for efficiency  in human  resources  development.
'  See, for example,  Belassa  (1988); Lamusse  (1986);  Tan (1987);  Corbo, et al. (1985);  and
Grfith  (1990).3
The market  process underlying  this hypothesis  begihs  with protectionist  trade policies that
open the way to factor market  segmeniation. By restricting  imports,  these policies produce an excess
demand for Imported  goods and an overvalued  exchange  rate. Because  many capital goods are
Imported  In developing  countries,  the relative  price and availability  of foreign exchange  affects  the
purchase  of imported capital equipment. The scarcity  of foreign exchange  is accentuatec'  by an
inward-focused  trade regime  through its incentive  to produce for import-substitution  rather  than
export. This often forces a government  into the rationing  of scarce  foreign exchange. Although
governments  typically give priority to capital goods imports, scarcity  prevents  the approval  of all
applications  for foreign exchange  and import licenses.
A government's  rationing  of scarce  foreign exchange  produces  capital market  segmentation.
The tendency is to favor capital investments  in protected  sectors of an economy  where retums are
more secure. This translates  into access  to imported  capital at prices well below  the opportunity cost
of scarce  foreign exchange  for selected import-substituting  firms in the modem sector. Other firms,
without access to fore.gn  exchange  on favorable  terms, are forced  to pay the higher cost of imported
capital equipment  in the black market,  or to pay the higher prices  of imported  capital goods in resale
markets (Haggblade,  et al., 1986). In either  case,  this creates  two groups of producers,  one with
relatively  low prices  for capital  goods, the other with higher prices.
This price "wedge"  in the cost of capital provides  an incentive  for the substitution  of capital  for
labor among the favored producers. To the extent this capital is skill-intensive,  it also increases  t1 F
demand for scarce skills. Other producers  wthout access  to imported capital goods on favorable
terms face a different  set of production  incentives. These  incentives  encourage  the choice of more
labor-intensive  production  technologies. The rationing  of foreign exchange  for capital imports tends
to favor large, modern sector firms against smaller,  informal  sector firms. The segmentation  of capital
markets itself  distorts choices affecting  employment  and skills demand,  and is usually  accompanied
by distortions in labor markets.4
Labor markets In an inward-focused  economy  need not become segmented  and price
distorted,  but there is a tendency  tor this to happen (Fields, 1990;  Belassa,  1988;  and Krueger,  1986).
Protectionist  trade policies reduce competitive  pressures  on labor markets. The sheltering  of
producers from global competition  provides  room for trade unions and governments  to intervene  In
!ibor  markets in wage  seKting  and employment  in ways that collectively  drive up wages and the cost
of labor (Balassa,  1988;  Krueger,  1986). The increase  in labor cost is sustained  by protectionism  that
limits the downward pressure  on domestic  producer prices. The cost of enforcing  labor market
regulations  tends to limit their application  to larger enterprises  which give rise to the informal  sector
and labor market segmentation  (Haggblade,  et al., 1986;  Rao, 1985).
In this fashion, inward-focused  trade regimes  are associated  with factor market segmentation
tnat distort production decisions  and market  pricing  signals  guiding human resources  development.
Krueger (19,33,  Table 7.1) reports  that in a three country study -- Chile, Pakistan,  and Tunisia  - a
protectionist  trade regime  lowered  the cost of capital  by more than 30 percent for producers  with
favorable  access  to foreign exchange. Using the same data, Balassa 1988) argues  that trade policies
reduce capital costs in inward-oriented  countries,  but have no effect in outward-oriented  countries. In
a study of seven  developing  countries,  Haggblade,  et al. (1986,  p.23) found the cost of capital  for
small  non-agricultural  enterpi-ises  to be as much as 30 percent  higher than that for large-scale
enterprises, The laKter  tended to be more capital-intensive  than the former.
Im1l1catlons  for Human Resources Development
The impact of trade regimes on factor markets and employment  raises  a number of interesting
questions  for macroeconomic  policy and human  resources  development. To begin, can labor market
price distortions  arising from an inward-focused  trade regime,  if ignored, impede  the successful
transition  to an outward-focused  economy? Stated  dffferently,  how important are labor reforms  to
achieving  sustained  economic growth through export-led  development? Will opening an economy to5
trade provide sufficient  market disc.ipline  to improve the competitive  behavior  of labor markets,  or is it
necessary  to accompany  macroeconomic  policy and trade reforms  with labor reforms?}'
There are even more challenging  questions. How essential  are labor reforms  to improving
efficiency  in human resources  development? What effects  do inefficiencies  in this development  have
on economic growth and adjustment  to macroeconomic  shocks? These  questions reflect  a demand-
side perspective  on the problem of etficiency  in skills development. The line of reasoning  is as
follows.  In an inward-focused  economy, distorted  pricing signals  in factor markets may lead to
inefficiencies  in the mix of skills produced and the choice of techno!ogies  and resources  used In  their
production.  Protectionist  trade policies can shelter producers  from the economic cost of external  and
intemal  inefficiencies  in skill development.
There is little empirical  research  available  on this issue.4 The implications  are that
competitive  labor markets with undistorted  pricing  signals  could be Important  to imposing market
discipline  on human resources  development  as it occurs  through education and training. The
preceding  analysis  of trade regimes  and factor markets  suggests  the possibility  of a link between  the
choice of an outward-focused  trade regime,  the presence  of competitive  factor market,, and
incentives  for the efficient  use of resources  in skills development. Indeed, it is dificult to foresee  an
economy competing effectively  in global markets  with inefficient  factor markets and distorted
incentives  for skills development. These  conditions would impede efficiency  in production.
A numF r of interesting  hypotheses  emerge  for human  resources  development. For example,
is there evidence  of greater efficiency  in human resources  development  in outward-focused  trade
regimes? What about economies  that have  experienced  structural  adjustment  moving from inward-  to
outward-focused  development  strategies? Is there evidence  of human resources  development
responding  to the changing pr.ce  signals  produced by this shift in development  strategies? Because
2/ Corbo, et al. (1985)  argue that well4unctioning  labor markets  are a necessary,  but not sufficient
condition for successful  export-oriented  growth. This view is shared by others (Krueger,  1988;
Haaparanta  and Kahkonen,  1986;  and Haggblade,  et al., 1986).
'  See Adams  and Schwartz  (1988)  for a review  of this research.6
skills  training by enterprises  tends to be more demand-driven  than training by public train;ng
institutions,  Is there a correlation  between  the  . ioice of a trade regime  and the balance  of public and
private  skills training?5'
In the section that follows, attention  is focused on the macroeconomic  trends and
development  strategies  of six developing  countries  chosen  to reflect a mix of trade regimes. This
comparison is subsequently  linked to a description  of the structure  and performance  of skills training
systems  in these countries  to explore  two questions. Do enterprises  and proprietary  institutions  play
a larger role in the training systems  of outward-focused  than of inward-focused  economies? Is there
evidence  of greater external  and internal  efficiency  in the training systems  of outward-focused
economies? The first of these questions  applies to the structure of training systems  and the second
to their performance.
MACROECONOMIC  TRENDS  AND DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGIES
The period of review  for this study, the 1980s,  was a period of considerable  change for
developing  coun' jes and, to a certain degree,  instability. Generally  speaking, it was also a period of
disappointment,  as growth rates  fell short of expectations,  and well below performance  during the
1970s. In 1980,  the World Bank forecast  average  annual real  growth of 4.5 to 5.1 percent in
developing  countries  for the first half of the decade and slightly  higher growth rates  for the second
half. However,  from 1980  to 1988,  this growth averaged  only 4.3 percent per annum, substantially
less  than the 5.6 percent  average of the 1970s (World  Bank, 1990).
Oil exporting  countries  began the 1980s  in a position of strength,  buoyed by the price and
income effects  of the second oil shock. The initially  favorable  economic outlook encouraged  the
continuation  of expansionary  fiscal policies,  indebtedness,  and for a number  of these countries,
overvalued  exchange  rates  that discouraged  non-oil exports. Trade and public sector deficits  began
Y' For a review of the literature  comparing  training in enterprises,  schools, and training centers  see
John Middleton,  Adrian Ziderman,  and Arvil  Van Adams, Skills  for Productivitv:  Policies  for Vocational
Education  and Training in Developing  Countries,  New York: Oxford University  Press (forthcoming).7
to emerge  In tandem with shortfalls  In revenues  as oil demand fell well short of expectations. Average
annual GDP  growth for oil exporters  as a whole was only 1 percent hetween  1980  and 1988.
Oil Importing  and exporting  countries  faced additional  price fluctuations,  such as t.tose
Imposed  by changing  terms of trade, tightened  trade regulations  of industrialized  countries,  and slow
growth in world markets. Malaysia,  for example,  had to face both falling oil and commouity  prices
from 1980  to 1984. By mid-decade,  the majority  of developing  countries had to face the need  for
stabilizattion  programs  to decrease  public budget and balance  of payments  deficits  and adjustment
programs  to reduce market  price distortions  and establish  conditions  favoring sustained  economic
growth.
GDP Growth Rates
The average  annual GDP growth rate in low-income  countries  was 6.4 percent  from i980 to
1988. For lower-middle  income  countries it was 2.6 percent  and for upper-middle  income countries  it
was 3.3 percent (World Bank, 1990). Of the six developing  countries  represented  in this study -
Egypt, Malaysia,  Nigeria, South Korea,  Thailand,  and TLni'  - five exceeded  the average  rate of
growth for their respective  income groups.  Nigeria  was the exception,  as its growth rate was -1.1
percent per annum over the period (See  Table 1).  The growth of these countries  is found below  to
vary with the choice of development  strategy.
South Korea,  which is highly dependent  on imported  oil, registered  negative  growth in 1980  in
response  to the second oil shock. The recession  extended  into 1982,  but thereafter,  the South
Korean  economy  experienced  an economic boom with real growth rates in excess  of 11 percent. In
Southeast  Asia, Thailand  and Malaysia  began to emerge  as newly industrializing  countres.  After  a
sharp, but brief recession  in 1986,  when real GDP growth fell to 4.5 percent,  Thailand's  economy
recovered  quickly with growth surging to 10 percent in 1988. Malaysia  experienced  a similar pattem
of recession  and a rapid, strong recovery.8
Table  1
GDP  Growth  Rates  for  Surv6yed  Countries
(Constant  1980  US$)
Country  1980-86  1987  1988  1980-88
Egypt  6.6  2.5  3.2  5.7
Malaysia  4.8  5.3  8.9  4.6
Nigeria  -2.1  -4.2  4.7  -1.1
South  Korea  9.2  1,.9  11.3  9.9
Thailand  5.5  8.1  10.0  6.0
Tunisia  3.5  5.8  1.5  3.4
Source:  World  Bank
The picture was different,  however,  for Egypt, Nigeria,  and Tunisia. Egypt,  after undergoing
strong oil-led  growth in the late 1970s  and early 1980s,  accompanied  by rising revenues  from the
opening of the Suez Canal  and remittances  from workers  abroad,  faced a drop In oil demand  and a
rapidly  deteriorating  economy  as the decade progressed. Also an oil producer,  Nigeria registered
negative  growth for most of the decade before  engineering  a recovery  in 1988. Tunisia  also
experienced  a drop In oil demand, but an adjustment  program and a devaluation  in 1986  led to a
recovery  in 1987. This recovery  was cut short, however,  by a severe  drought in 1988  with GDP
growth falling to 1.5 percent.
Budaet Deficits and Balance of Trade
Budget deficits  were the rule in the six countries  from 1980  to 1986  (Table  2). This
expansionary  fiscal policy appeared  to work in Malaysia,  South Korea,  and Thailand  where the
subsequent  Increase  in real  output led to a reduction  of deficit spending  as a percent of GDP.
Tunisia  also showed signs of success  in 1987, befo,e  the sharp  downtum in 1988. The policy was
less succassful  in Egypt,  however,  as measured  by the slowing of the economy  and the rising budget
deficit as a percent of GDP. A similar  pattern in Nigeria  was reversed  with the uptum of the economy
In 1988  and a reduction of the budget deficit in relation  to GDP.9
Table  2
Current  Accuunt  and  Public  Sector  Budget
Balances  as a Percent  of GDP
CoMntry  Current  Account/GDP  Public  Sector  Budget/GDP
1980-86  1987  1988  1980-86  1987  1988
Egypt  -11.6  -11.8  -7.9  -11.7  8.4  -16.3
Malaysia  -6.3  7.6  4.7  -10.1  -7.6  -4.3
Nigeria  -1.5  -0.3  -3.5  -6.2  -9.8  -8.0
South  Korea  -2.1  7.5  8.2  -1.5  0.4  1.6
Thailand  -4.9  -1.0  -3.2  -4.7  -2.4  -2.0
Tunisia  -7.4  -1.0  0.9  -5.2  -3.0  -3.9
Source:  World  Bank
.mprovements  in the current  account balance  associated  with trade were important  to
reducing  deficit spending and improving  a country's  capacity  to manage  extemal  debt.  The injection
of spending  provided by export growth during the decade in Malaysia,  South Korea,  Thailand,  and
Tunisia  reduced the need for expansionary  fiszal policy and deficit spending. Exports  enabled these
countries  to import without incurring  additional  extemal  debt.  Events  in Nigeria,  however,  were
dfflerent  as the current  account balance  further deteriorated. Weak export growth In Egypt and the
financing of a continuing stream  of imports with external  debt made it one of the most highly indebted
countries In  th6 world in the 1980s.Y
DeveloDment  Strategles
Economic  growth is closely  associated  with the choice of trade regimes  In the six countries.
While  it Is difficult  to measure  precisely  the development  strategy employed  in each country, the
evidence  suggests  that South Korea  during  the 1980s  was strongly outward-focused. The trade
SY  Egypt's budget deficit of -16.3 percent relative  to GDP was the largest  such deficit in 1988  among
all countries. Higher deficits,  however,  had been recorded  in the early 1980s. In 1982,  for example,
Malaysia  initiated  structural  reform in response  to a public sector budget deficit of 19% and a current
account deficit of 14% of GDP.10
regimes  of Malaysia  and Thailand  could also be described  as outward-focused  and were shifted
further in this direction by reforms  during the decade. In contrast,  however,  Egypt, Nigeria,  and
Tunisia  entered  the 1980s  with largely  inward-focused  trade regimes. The three countries  attempted
with unequal results  to shift to export-led  development  as the decade progressed.
South Korea,  Malaysia,  and Thailand  exhibited  strong export-led  growth from 1980  to 1986,
consistent  with their outward-focused  trade regimes (Table  3). This growth appeared  to accelerate  as
the decade progressed,  softening  somewhat  in 1988. Manufactured  goods accounted  for most of
South Korea's export growth, and were a major source of the growth in Malaysia  and Thailand  in
1987  and 1988. In both the iatter  countries, manufactured  goods rose sharply  as a percent of total
exports. Declining  demand  for oil slowed  export growth in Egypt and Tunisia  from 1980  to 1986,  and
in Nigeria,  exports actually  declined. Trade reforms  led to the subsequent  expansion  of exports in all
three countries  with manufactured  goods rising  as a share  of total exports.
Table  3
Growth  of Exports  and  Manufactured  Share  of Exports
1980-1988
Country  Growth  Rate  of Exports  Manufacture  Share (Ratio)
1980-86  1987  1988  1980-86  1987  1988
Egypt  2.1  6.3  44.2  10.1  19.6  24.5
Malaysia  8.6  14.4  11.9  25.8  39.5  45.2
Nigeria  -8.5  -29.6  10.8  0.8  1.6  2.2
South  Korea  11.6  21.6  13.1  91.2  92.4  93.3
Thailand  8.7  20.6  19.6  34.4  52.5  51.6
Tunisia  1.0  14.2  24.5  42.3  60.7  64.1
Source:  World  Bank
Movements  in exchange  rates  are connected with shifts in trade regimes. The devaluation  of
exchange  rates  encourages  exports and outward-focused  development,  while inflation  of exchange
rates  is a sign of protectionist  trade policies  and inward-focused  development. Egypt was the only
country among the six whose exchange  rate appreciated  consistently  over the period from 1980  to11
1988  (Table  4).  Nigeria,  whose exchange  rate had appreciated  during the 1970s  as a result of oil
revenues,  initially  resisted  reform in the 1980s,  but was forced to take dristic action to counteract
mounting  deficKs. The Naira  was devalued  by 64 percent  in the last quarter of 1986,  and another 16
percent  In 1987.
Table  4
Indices  of Real  Effective  Exchange  Rates
(1980-100)
Country  1980-86  1987  1988
Egypt  133.4  156.4  159.0
Malaysia  105.4  87.8  79.6
Nigeria  128.7  29.0  29.7
Souith  Korea  98.8  80.2  88.9
Thailand  100.7  79.9  77.3
Tunisia  96.0  71.2  69.8
Source:  World  Bank
Impact on Factor Markets
Agarwala  (1983)  studied market price distortions,  including  factor markets,  in the early  1980s
for 31 developing  countries. His findings confirm the link between  trade regimes and factor market
price distortions. He developed  criteria  for ranking price distortions in fiscal, monetary,  and exchange
rate policies; product markets;  finance and credit markets;  labor markets;  and the public sector. The
distortion  rankings given  for each of these features  were low =  1, medium = 2, and high = 3.  The
rankings were averaged  across all features  for each country. Price  distortions in the six comparator
countries  show a correlation  with the trade regimes described  above (Table  5).12
Table  S
Market  Price  Distortion  Indices
Country  Price  Distortion  Index
Total  Labor  CaRital
Outward-focuse
Malaysia  1.57  2  2
South Korea  1.57  1  2
Thailand  1.43  1  1
Inrd4fcused
Egypt  2.14  3  3
Nigeria  2.71  3  3
Tunisia  1.57  1  2
Source: Agarwala,  1983.
Egypt and Nigeria,  for example,  with strongly inward-focused  trade regimes  exhibit the highest
levels  of market price distortions. Outward-focused  trade regimes in Malaysia,  South Korea,  and
Thailand,  on the other hand, are associated  with low levels  of market price distortion. The only
exception  to this pattern  seems  to be Tunisia,  which is described  above as moderately  inward-
focused, but whose price distortion  index matches  that of countries  like South Korea. Here,  in the
case of labor market price distortions,  Agarwala's  Judgement  conflicts with a later U.S.  Agency  for
Intemational  Development  study (Rucker,  1990)  which found strong evidence  of policy distortions In
Tunisian  labor markets.
Agarwala  referred  to the difficulty  of comparing  labor market  price distortions since very few
developing  countries  have systematic  data on wages and productivity. His basic Indicator  was
whether real wages In manufacturing  rose significantly  faster  than per capita real income adjusted  for
changes In extemal  terms of trade.  He also included In his subjective  ranking any signfficant
evidence  of govemment  and trade union interventions  In labor markets. In Egypt and Nigeria,  he13
refers  to the widening  gap in the 1970s  between  wages and productivity. Malaysia's  medium
distortion ranking appears  to be based on its "Malay  first" policy in employment.
Labor marke distortions  were foulid to explain  about 10 percent of the variance  in economic
growth for the 31 countries (Agarwala,  p. 27). Low labor market  distortion countries performed  much
better In overall  GDP growth. These countries  averaged  5.9 percent real GDP growth in the 1970s
compared  with 4.5 percent  in high labor market distortion  countries. Lower trade and exports are
also associated  with labor market distortions. The growth rate of exports averaged  6.5 percent  in the
1970s  in low labor market  distortion countries  compared with -0.3 percent in high labor market
distortion countries.
In terms of labor market  distortions,  Egypt and South Korea  are at opposite ends of a policy
spectrum  just as they are in the case of trade regimes. A World Bank study (1991)  of Egyptian  labor
markets identifies  extensive  government  policy interventions  in these markets separating  wages from
productivity. The public sector in Egypt accounts  for 53 percent of nonagricultural  employment
thereby making its wage and employment  policies  quite important. Real  wages in the public sector
were allowed  to decline in the 1980s  with the downturn  of government  revenues,  but for equity
reasons  the reduction  was restricted  largely  to the wages  of skilled workers,  producing a high level of
wage  compression. Wage  setting had little  to do with productivity  and more with perceptions  of
equity.
In the 1970s,  public sector wages in Egypt were roughly 30 percent higher  than those in the
private  sector, and public employment  had attractive  fringe benefits  in the form of pensions, health
care, and stability of employment. Public sector employment  was guaranteed  to graduates  of
secondary  technical  schools and universities. These  policies helped produce a segmented  labor
market that had a queue of applicants  for the higher  wage sector. The deterioration  of the Egyptian
economy and falling real wages in relation  to the private sector, however,  failed to produce a flow of
workers  out of public sector employment  in the 1980s. The security  and other non-wage  benefits  of14
this employment  encouraged  workers  to hold on to these jobs while taking secona and third jobs to
survive.
Under these circumstances,  labor mobility  was reduced slowing  economic adjustment and
causing public sector wages to fall even  further than would have been the case had the labor supply
adjusted (World  Bank, 1991,  pp. 49-53). Labor mobiiity  was also adversely  affected in the private
sector by government  restrictions  on hiring and firing. These  restrictions  discouraged  employment
generation. Employers  were forced to use the state employment  service  to recruit  employees  and
were unable to lay off workers  without approval  from the Ministry  of Manpower,  which involved  a
lengthy  adjudicatory  process. Costly social insurance  charges  also reduced employment  generation
in the modem private sector. The combination  of these interventions  distorted  the competitive
operation of Egyptian  labor markets.
In contrast to Egypt, labor markets  in South Korea in the 1980s appeared competitive.
Korean  labor markets were very effective  in adjusting to changing paKtems  of labor iemand
(Stevenson,  1988).  Govemment  interventions  were kept to a minimum. The govemment  played little
or no role In wage setting,  or regulation  of labor markets. Moreover,  it imposed  various  legal barriers
to union activities  which weakened collective  bargaining  in the early 1980s.  As a result,  there were
few institutional  impediments  to real  wage adjustment-. When govemment  did intervene  in wage
setting  in this period through the settlement  of labor disputes, it was often in the direction  of wage
restraint.
The laisser-faire  approach of South Korea  was thus very different  from Egypt's interventionist
model. Labor markets in Malaysia  and Thailand  are conside;ed  closer  to the South Korean  model
than to the Egyptian  model. The flexibility  of labor markets  is given  a share of the credit in Malaysia
and Thailand  for the rapid recovery  of each country from the mid-decade  recession (Mazumdar,  1990;
Sussangkam,  1990). Tunisian  labor markets,  on the other hand, appear closer  to the interventionist
model. Rucker (1990)  describes  a list of interventions  leading  to labor market  segmentation  in
Tunisia. He credits labor market regulations  for the increase  in capital intensity  to avoid labor use in15
the modem sector. While modern sector labor markets in Nigeria  are strongly interventionist,  these
markets account for only 11 percent  of the country's  total employment  (Birks and Sinclair, 1991).
STRUCTURE  AND PERFORMANCE  OF SKILLS  TRAINING
The economic trends above support the existence  of links among macroeconomic  policies,
trade regimes,  and competition  in factor markets. But what implications,  if any, do these linked
factors have for the structure  and parformance  of human resources  development? To state the issue
more generally,  does a country's economic  environment  and development  strategies,  as embodied  in
these linkages,  strongly influence  the nature  and success  of human resources  development? This
section examines  the six countries  for evidence  of a relationship  between  the economic environment
and the provision of skills training. It looks first at the structure  of vocational  education  and training
(VET)  systems  to assess  whether open economies  and competitive  factor markets  exhibit flexible  and
responsive  training systems. Where  the private  sector plays an important  role in this structure,
training is expected  to be more flexible  and responsive  to market  forces. The section looks next at
the actual performance  of VET  systems  and whether open economies  and competitive  factor markets
demand greater  internal and external  efficiency  of public and private  training systems.
A full appreciation  of the VET  system  in a country involves  understanding  the following:
o  the division of institutional  responsibility  for training between  schools,  training centers,
equipment  suppliers,  and enterprises,
o  the division between  formal and nonformal  training, and between  apprenticeship  and
on-the-job  training in enterprises  and other categories  of training,
o  the policies  and incentives  that shape the content and responsiveness  of particular
forms of training to economic  conditions,  and
o  the methods of financing components  of the VET  system,  and whether and how
trainees pay for their trairing.
The information  available  regarding  these features  varies in detail  in each of the six countries
limiting  direct comparisons. The analysis,  reflecting  this variation,  attempts  to decipher  the broad
trends and tendencies  with regard to the structure  and performance  of VET. It examines  these16
outcomes early in the 1980s  in the three largely  outward-focused  and three largely  inward-focused
countries. It also examines  how these outcomes  are affected as the three inward-focused  countries
attempted in mid-decade  to adopt export-led  development  strategies,  although here the results  are
much more tentative  since the time for observing  the VET  system's  response  is limited to only a few
years. The analysis  begins by looking at the structure  of VET  in the six countries.
Tho VET Structure
Export-led  economies  are subject to the pressures  of global competition  demanding  cost-
effective  training systems  that are flexible  and responsive  to market  forces. The ab'iRfy  to expand
production quickly, shift workers  in response  to changing product demand, introduce  cost-saving
technologles,  and meet the human resource  needs of new industries  requires  country VET  systems
that are sensiive to market  demand and competition. The inability  to respond  quickly to this
competition  can impede  the success of an export strategy. This need for VET  responsiveness  in
outward-focused  economies  suggests  that market-oriented  VET systems  in such settings  will feature
considerable  diversity  in their structure  and programs  to enable them to react  to the changing needs
of a dynamic market-oriented  economy
South Korea's outward oriented  economy has a VET  system  that displays exactly  this kind of
diversity. The system is diversified  in that it has a range of training institutions  designed  to serve  a
number  of clienteles. Training  providers  include public and private  vocational  high schools, a system
of night classes  in vocational  high schools  for employed school leavers,  junior colleges,  virtually  all
private,  that train technicians  and skilled  workers, private  firms that provide skills training for
employees  and public vocational  training institutes. Clienteles  include  students in pre-employment
training, new entrants  and re-entrants  to the labor force, job changers  and job losers,  and the
employed  searching  for training on the job during working hours or, alternatively  off the job during
non-working  hours.17
This diversification  of the VET  system in South Korea  results  from the system's  orientation
toward the market demand for skills. A major  feature  of the system's  evolution has been its focus on
and responsiveness  to the labor-skill  demands  arising  from the economic development  process. An
important  contributing feature  to this responsiveness  has been  the sizable  training role of the private
sector. Lee (1986)  finds enterprise  training accounting  for just under 40 percent of public and private
sector training capacity.Y Program  diversity  may reflect  responsiveness  of VET  to market forces, as it
does in the South Korean  case.  But this diversity  may also reflect  a lack of pressure  for efficiency  In
skills training with an increasing  redundancy  of programs  and training activities.
Diversity  that is redundant  does not provide a widening  menu of relatively  successful
programs  serving  the needs of different  clientele. Instead,  it represents  a piling up of new programs
with severely  limited chances  for success  on top of older, unsuccessful  programs  that continue  to
limp along rather  than being terminated. In particular,  the complexity  may be generated  by a
continual groping to try new initiatives  because  existing  ones fail to achieve  their objectives. The
redundancy  tends to arise in situations  where markets  exhibit significant  distortions so that the
usignals*  received  by individuals  and training institutions  are misleading. It can arise where market
distortions inhibit employment  generation  and VET  is diverted  from preparing  individuals  for
productive  employment  to achieving  broader social objectives,  including  that of delaying  entry into the
labor  force.
The Tunisian  experience  provides  an example  of this redundancy. The Tunisian  VET  system
has been supply-driven  and dependent  on government  planning  for employment  creation. In the mid-
1980s,  the Tunisian  economy was unable to create enough jobs for its rapidly expanding  labor force.
Macroeconomic  problems  were exacerbated  by distortions and inflexibilities  in labor markets. The
high ievel  of diversity  and complexity  observed  in the Tunisian  VET  system emerged  from the
system's response  to the absence  of adequate  employment  opportunities  for new labor force
LY  The enterprise  share of total training capacity  in 1977  was initially  as high as 70 percent  following
adoption of tax incentives  for private  training in 1976.18
entrants. Macroeconomic  failures  to generate  enough employment  growth led to pressures  for the
VET system  to "do something." The "something"  often took the form of the system  creating yet
another  training program to serve  a group having  trouble obtaining employment.
A brief catalog of employment  training programs  and initiatives  illustrates  the diverse  and
complex range of programs  Tunisia  created in response  to its perceived  labor market adjustment
problems. The VET  system in Tunisia,  like that in South Korea,  includes  vocationally-oriented
programs in the school system, public vocational  training outsirlA  the school system,  and training
programs run by public enterprises  and private  training institu.  i;  The public sector accounts for
most lnitiatives.Y  Cherif  (1990)  lists employment  training programs  in the 1980s  for graduates  of
secondary  technical  schools, vocational  training centers,  and higher education. He mentions  others
for rural development,  youth employment  promotion, and productive  families. The proliferation  of
employment  training programs he cites is indicative  of a VET  system  concerned  with employment
shortfalls  rather than market demand  for skilled workers.
Thus, both South Korea  and Tunisia  exhibit diversity  in their VET  systems,  but with different
goals. The goal in Tunisia  was to compensate  for macroeconomic  failures,  while that in South Korea
was to complement  rapid economic growth and macroeconomic  successes. The latter  creates
incentives  for private sector involvement  on the part of enterprises  and proprietary  training institutions.
As already indicated,  the private sector plays an important  role in the South Korean  VET system,  and
a much smaller  role in Tunisia. Egypt with its strongly  inward-focused  economy shares many of the
same problems  experienced  by Tunisia. Employment  growth in Egypt's modem sector economy was
stagnant  in the 1980s. The private sector was largely  absent  from its VET  system. A World Bank
study (1989)  found expansion  of public VET  in Egypt unrelated  to producer demand,  and instead,
concerned  with reducing  demand for higher  education  which was provided  tuition-free.
V' Cherif  (1990) reports  that 9 out of 10 secondary  students  are enrolled in govemment  schools In
Tunisia. Outside  the school system  in 1984,  3 out of 4 trainees  were enrolled in govemment
vocational  training centers. The government  was responsible  for all employment  training program
inRtiatives  during the 1980s.19
With the exception of Nigeria  which has nearly 90 percent of its employment  in the informal
sector, the private sector's participation  in VET  systems  is correlated  with a country's choice of
macroeconomic  policies,  trade regime,  and factor market  competition. The ooen economies  of
Malaysia  and Thailand,  as well as that of South Korea,  appear  to has@  significant  private sector
participation  in human resources  development. Hopkins (1990)  estimates  that around 30 percent of
technical  training in Malaysia  occurs in private  institutions  and that nearly  two-thirds of all vocational
training takes place in the private  sector.  He notes that private  vocational  schools are widespread  in
Malaysia  from little more than large  offices providing  language  or computer programming  to
substantial  post-secondary  institutions  with enrollments  of over 4,000  students.
Private  institutions  also account  for an important  share of VET  in Thailand,  according to
Brimble  and Rachatatanum  (1990). In 1988,  enrollments  in formal VET  were over 447,000. Slightly
more than 183,000  of these enrollments  were in private  institutions. Nonformal  VET enrollments
numbered  over 474,000  in 1987  with nearly 151,000  in the private  sector. The fragmentary  evidence
provided regarding  the imporiance of private  sector participation  in the delivery  of VET  is consistent
with expectations. In the open economies  of Malaysia,  South Korea,  and Thailand,  VET  systems
would seem to be more market-driven  by virtue of the role played  by the private  sector in skills
training. This is not the case  for the inward-focused  economies  of Egypt and Tunisia.
Nigeria provides  an interesting  exception  to this pattern. Strongly  inward-focused,  Nigeria
exhibits  a segmented  labor market. Its small modern sector,  approximately  11 percent of the
country's total employment,  is dominated  by a larger informal  sector. Training  for the informal  sector
is customarily  carried out through apprenticeships,  rarely  through the formal  VET system. Oni and
Sinclair (1990)  confirm that all secondary  vocational  schools, secondary  technical  schools and
polytechnics  are state-run  and funded in Nigeria. The private  sector thus plays only a limited role in
training for the modern  sector, although  the authors refer to the emergence  in the 1980s  of private
training for skills that are acquired  quickly, require  modest capital equipment,  and for which skill20
achievement  is easily verified. Still, the private  sector Is a major source of skills  training In Nigeria by
virtue of the size of the Informal  sector and use of apprenticeships.
Apart from the emergence  of proprietary  training in Nigeria,  there is very little evidence  on
which to base a conclusion about a shift in the structure  of VET toward the private sector as Egypt,
Nigeria,  and Tunisia  engaged in macroeconomic  reforms  in mid-decade. This leaves  open the
question  of whether a country that moves  to export-led  development  will introduce  competition  in VET
systems  leading to a larger role for the private  sector in training. Evidence  from Thailand,  however,
illustrates  how government  regulation  of private  training can impede market  adjustments  by imposing
barriers  to entry on the part of private  training institutions.
Brimble  and Rachatatantim  (1990)  identify  the regulation  of prices  as a barrier  to entry  to
private training institutions  in Thailand. Fearing  price gouging by the private  sector, the Thai
government  limits tuition that can be charged by proprietary  institutions  for skills training. Public
sector training institutions  which have  the most to gain from restricting  entry  are involved  in the setting
of tuition limits. Brimble  and Rachatatanum  contend that tuition limits are set low enough to make it
unprofitable  for the private  sector to provide skills training. They cite this as an explanation  for the low
quality of some private skills  training and the tendency of the private sector to focus on low-cost  skills
training. Their study calls for removing  price regulations  and focusing instead  on other forms of
consumer  protection,  including accreditation.
Performance of VET
Competition  in factor markets  calls for efficiency  in the choice of skills produced by a VET
system  and the methods  used to produce them.  It is difficult  to foresee  an enterprise  being able to
compete In worid markets  with a training system whose output Is unrelated  to the market  demand  for
skills (extemal  efficiency)  and whose operation  is not cost-effective  (intemal  efficiency). The high
labor costs associated  with such a system  are expected  to encourage  enterprises  to put pressure  on
public systems  to improve efficiency  in skills  training, take more responsibility  themselves  for training,21
or alternatively,  adopt more capital lrtensive production methods. Only enterprises  In protected
markets  could afford training inefficiencies  leading  to higher  labor costs.  The comparison of the six
countries supports  the link between  market  competition  and VET performance.
The importance  of competition  in factor markets  and its impact on the efficiency  of human
resou.ces  develo; 'ent  is partially  confirmed  by the structure  of private  and public training described
in the section above. That is, to the extent  that private enterprises  and proprietary  training Instiutions
are more efficient providers  of skills training, the larger share of private  training observed  in the three
export-led  economies  is consistent  with a link between  the macroeconomic  environment  and the
efficiency  of VET  systems  in these countries.9'  The extension  of this argument  calls for looking at the
impact of competitive  factor markets  on efficiency  in the public training sector. If competition  works, it
should also encourage  a more efficient  public training sector, unless  this sector is sheltered  from
competition.
The testing of this hypothesis  is more difficult  than that above involving  the structure of VET.
This test requires measures  of intemal  and external  efficiency  for private  and public sector training.
The evidence  available  is limited and not well suited to a controlled  comparison. The best
comparison  is found in South Korea. Lee (1985)  computes social rates of return for public vocational
training institutes,  technical  high schools,  and in-plant  training in enterprises. The social rates of
return represent  a combination  of internal  and external efficiency  measures  comparing  the cost and
benefits  of the three types of skills training. The social rates of return are respectively,  17.2  percent
for the public vocational  training institutes,  11.1  percent  for the technical high schools,  and 28.3
percent for in-plant  training in private enterprises.-L'
2  A stronger  test of the causal  structure of this relationship  would be the observation  of changes  in
the share of private  training as an economy shifts to export-led  development.
SO In this comparison,  the graduates  of public vocational  training institutes  and technical  high schools
were required  to undergo  the same six-month  in-plant  training as other recruits  from the labor pool.
Lee (p.28) adjusts the social rates  of return  for this "double  training." The return  for vocational  training
institutes  falls to 10.7 percent  and technical  high schools  to 8.1 percent.22
The efficiency  of private  training is borne out In this comparison. The public sector fared less
well, but a more favorable  comparison  emerges  from a subsequent  estimate  of social rates of return
for public secondary  vocational  schools  and private  technical  junior colleges  (Lee, J.-K., 1986). In this
case,  the social rates of return are roughly the same,  exceeding 14 percent. While exceptions  might
be found, the evidence  suggests  that public training in open, competitive  economies  can be efficient
alongside private training. Further  evidence  of this is offered  by Hopkins (1990)  in Malaysia,  although
here the data are more problematic. In terms of internal  efficiency,  Hopkins  indicates  that dropout
and repeater  rates seem to be low for both private and public vocational  schools.  Public schools
exhibit better capacity  utilization. However,  placement  rates,  a measure  of external  efficiency,  are said
to be higher  for private institutions.
The evidence  in Malaysia  is not sufficiently  robust  to build a case  for parity between  public
and private sectors  in VET. The evidence  would probably  favor the private  over the public sector. To
reiterate,  the more important  question is whether  the competitive  forces generated  by an open
economy create incentives  for the public sector to emulate  the private sector in terms of VET  being
responsive  to market  forces. Rather  than simply looking at static comparisons  of VET  efficiency,  this
requires  comparisons  of change. The issue of change in the structure  of VET was framed  above in
terms of whether  the private sector share of VET  increases  as an economy  shifts to an export-led
development  strategy. Here,  the issue  of change  i;  whether  an open economy encouragas  an
Inefficient  public sector VET  system  to become more efficient,  internally  and externally.
There is evidence  of this happening  in Malaysia  with the government  currently  engaging  in a
major reform of the public VET system  to make it more demand-driven. By the same token, South
Korea  has regularly  engaged in reforms  of its public training system. As the economy's needs for
skills have changed  through various  stages  of development,  Stevenson  (1988)  reports that South
Korea has been quick to adapt its public training system  to meet these needs. Middleton,  et al.
(1991) offers  further insight into the complexities  governing  public VET  and its responsiveness  to
competition  in Thailand. The authors  argue that public VET  is of good quality, but less  flexible  to23
change than private  VET. They find that the heavily  subsidized  public system of VET  responds  to
problems  of excess  supply more slowly than the private  sector (p. 98).
The amount of competitive  pressure  placed  on the public sector by private VET  in Thailand,
as mentioned  earlier,  Is constrained  by the introduction  of tuition ceilings  that restrict entry. This type
of regulation  and the centralization  of administration  and budgeting in the public sector are factors
that can contribute  to the isolation  of public VET  from competitive  market  forces in other countries.
Budgets driven by numbers of students  without weighing  placements  or other performance  measures
build a certain Inertia  into the system. Centralized  program  administration  makes  curriculum  changes
time consuming  and costly. The same can be said for employment  of instructors. In time, even these
impediments  to change could be broken down by market  competition  as enterprises  collectively  place
demands  on governments  and public VET  for reform, but as illustrated  by Thailand  the process may
be slow and costly to the economy.
In the inward-focused  Egyptian  economy,  the public sector does not face effective  competition
from the private  sector for the deiivery  of VET. Public  technical  education offered  by the Ministry  of
Education  accounts for 52 percent of secondary  enrollments. Public general  education  accounts for
the remainder. Other technical  ministries,  e.g., housing  and industry,  also provide skills training as do
large public enterprises  and public authorities  like  the Suez  Canal Authority. The World Bank (1q91)
found that the system had expanded  without a focus on market needs. Instead, it is supply driven by
the number  of students  entering the system  and it is used primarily  to reduce  the flow of students  into
general education. Rapid population  growth and a deteriorating  macroeconomic  situation in the
198Os  has meant more students  and the squeezing  of resources. This has produced a marked
deterioration  in the quality of training at all levels  of the technical  education system.
The impact of the macroeconomic  environment  on VET  efficiency  in Egypt is twofold. First,
the slow growth produced by this environment  and the resulting  shortfall  of public revenues  have led
to a decilne in the quality of training and a reduction  of its internal efficiency. Second,  the failure of
the economy to expani and produce jobs has reduced  the external  efficiency  of public VET. Market24
price distortions have  failed  to provide the VET system  with an effective  set of market signals  to gulde
the use of scarce resources  in skills training. The diversion  of its objectives  from market  needs to
social needs has reduced  the incentives  for system efficiency. VET  in Egypt contrasts  sharply with
that in export-led  economies  like South Korea. There,  economic growth has made cost-effective  skills
development  a necessity. The market signals  and incentives  have encouraged  efficiency  in both
public and private  VET.
The evidence in Nigeria  is fragmented  and anecdotal. Negative  growth in the economy
produced many of the same outcomes  for pre-ernployment  training observed  in Egypt. Birks and
Sinclair (1991)  report that after 1982  and the collapsing of state revenues,  the government  was unable
to pay teachers'  salaries  leading  to the closure of many schools  and classes. This led to a decline in
enrollments  in secondary  technical  education  and in polytechnics. The authors indicate  that the
quality of instruction  at the technical  secondary  schools was poor and declined through  the 1980s  in
responce  to budget pressures  (p. 53). External  efficiency  appeared  to be low as employers  found it
difficult  to evaluate  the quality of graduates  due to the fragmentation  of technical secondary  schools
and the many different  points  at which students  could exit the system. The links between  the
instruction provided  and the local labor markets  were considered  tenuous.
Birks and Sinclair  (p. 55) describe  in-employment  training in more favorable  terms.  Large
private  employers  and public enterprises  offered  training  that led directly  to employment. This was
also true of employers  in the informal  sector in apprenticeships. Private  proprietary  training emerged
In the 1980s  as the economy  deterlorated  and the demand grew for skills that would lead  to a job.
This training served both the informal and modern sectors. The authors  state that proprietary  training
was able to grow as a result of the absence  of prohibitive  regulations,  the growing demand for
produetive  skills, and the disenchantment  with formal pre-employment  modes of skills training (p. 59).
The response  of private  training in this context is an important  finding. In contrast to Thailand  which
imposed  regulatory barriers  to entry into private  training, the absence  of these barriers  In Nigeria
resuited in a private sector response  to emerging market  demand.25
Nigeria with its initiallv  strongly inward-focused  economy  illustrates  a wide gap In efficiency
between  public and private  VET,  a gap wider  than that observed  in South Korea,  Malaysia,  and
Thailand. The interestincg  question  which only additional  time will answer  is how long It will take for
the public sector to respond to the changing market  signals  provided  by Nigeria's  effort to restructure
its trade regime. In many respects  Nigeria provides  a better illustration  of the link between  the
macroeconomic  environment  and human resources  development  than Egypt,  where the absence  of a
real exchange  rate devaluation  continues  to shelter the economy in the late 1980s. No private sector
response  caii be detected  in the case of Egypt.
Cherif (1990,  p. 40) contends  that the external  efficiency  of Tunisia's  public VET system  is low
and that the private  sector has failed to assume  responsibility  for training. The evidence he provides,
however,  while pointing  to the public system's  failure to adjust  the mix of skills produced to the
market demand,  suggests that the more important  failure is found in Tunisia's  macroeconomic
policies and the lack of employment  generation  to absorb the rapidly  expanding  number of youths
entering  the labor force.  The problem is similar  to that in Egypt. Low placement  rates  for VET
graduates  are associated  with high levels of open unemployment. The low external  efficiency  of VET
in Tunisia  leads  to low internal  efficiency  by reducing  incentives  for enrollment  in training. Cherif (p.
49) estimates  that capacity  utilization  of the VET  system is around 62 percent.
CONCLUSIONS  AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study extends  the theory that links macroeconomic  policies,  trade regimes,  and factor
market competition  to include human  resources  development. It examines  whether inward-focused
development  strategies  reduce  factor market  competition  and incentives  for efficiency  in skills
development  and attempts  to test whether  trade reforms  and movement  to export-led  growth instill
competition  and incentives  to improve the efficiency  of skills  training. These  questions  are addressed
by comparing  vocational education  and training (VET)  systems  in six developing  countries in the
1980s. The six countries  were evenly divided between  inward- and outward-focused  development26
strategies. With varying degrees  of success,  the three inward-focused  countries  in mid-decade
attempted  to adopt export-led  development  strategies.
The findings, quJIified  as a result of data limitations,  indicate  that outward-foc.used  countries
competing in a globai economy do encourage  efficiency  in human resources  development. This
appears  through higher levels  of private sector VET  activity  and through intemal and extemal
efficiency  in public sector VET  that more closely matches  that of the private  sector. A stronger  test of
this relationship  in the three inward-focused  economies,  correlating  changes  in trade policies with
changes in private  sector VET  activity and public sector VET  efficiency,  is constrained  by the short
period of time available  for comparisons  and the absence  of data on changes  in VET  efficiency. The
limited evidence  in hand suggests  that VET  systems  do respond to the competitive  pressures  created
by export-led  development  so long as the regulation  of private  VET  does not impose a barrier  to entry
and public VET  is forced to compete  with the private  sector.
The findings have policy implications  for structural  adjustment  programs  and government
initiatives  to expand the base cf 4 private  resources  available  for human resources  development  and
improve  the effectiveness  and efficiency  of public expenditures  on vocational  education and training.
For structural  adjustment  programs,  the study offers  evidence  of a connection  between
macroeconomic  policies,  trade regimes,  and competitive  factor markets. Developing  this connection
in policy terms and opening an economy  to trade is a potentially  important  tool for reducing  factor
market  segmentation  and the distortion  of incentives  for human,  resources  development. However,
the responsiveness  of factor markets  to the opening of economies  and the pace of endogenous
reforms  remain  important policy questions  that will determine  the need for capital and labor market
reforms  as part of adjustment programs.
Slow growth in the 1980s  has threatened  public expenditures  on human resources
development  in many developing  countries. The study's findings suggest  actions that can be taken
to cou:nteract  this threat. Opening  an economy  to trade and the presence  of competitive  factor
markets  produce incentives  for private  investment  in skills development. It also appears  to create27
incentives  for Improving  the effectiveness  and efficiency  of public  expenditures  on  this development.
To accelerate  the supply  response  to these  incentives  by public  and private  training  institutions,  the
study  suggests  the importance  of taking  positive  steps  to eliminate  binding  regulations  on private  VET
and  to subject  public  VET  to market  competition.  These  steps  promise  to expand  the base  of private
resources  available  for skills  development  and result  in a more  cost-effective  use  of public  resources.
The  findings  of the study,  of course,  based  on a comparative  study  of six  developing
countries,  are subject  to further  validation.  This  would  include  expanding  the number  of countries
studied  and improving  the measures  of VET  structure  and performance  used. Broadening  the
regional  mix  of countries  would  be  especially  important  to reduce  the potential  regional  bias  of the
study. Future  investigations  of this topic  should  also  explore  its dynamic  dimensions.  That  is,
research  should  be directed  to how  changes  in trade  regimes  affect  the liberalization  of labor  markets,
and subsequently,  how  these  changes  influence  shifts  in the structure  and  performance  of VET.
Attention  should  be given  to the identification  of conditions  under  which  VET  systems  respond  rapidly
to changing  trade  regimes  and market  signals.28
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